Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: [saag] Is opportunistic

On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 1:01 PM, Brian E Carpenter <
brian(_dot_)e(_dot_)carpenter(_at_)gmail(_dot_)com> wrote:


RFC3205 (BCP56) said some of it a bit earlier, and was ignored. I'd say
that
RFC3639 was ignored too. For a practical lesson on the same topic, I
suggest
a critical study of all the RTCWEB drafts and of draft-ietf-dart-dscp-rtp.
I think they show the depth of the hole we are in.

   Brian

Just so I don't rudely put words in your mouth, I'd appreciate your
unpacking what you practical lesson you anticipate learning there.

regards,

Ted

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Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?, (continued) Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?, Theodore Ts'o RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?, Christian Huitema Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?, Nico Williams RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?, Bernard Aboba Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?, Stephen Farrell RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?, Bernard Aboba Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?, Stephen Farrell Message not available Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?), Eric Burger Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?), Michael StJohns Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?), Brian E Carpenter Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?), Ted Hardie <= Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?), Brian E Carpenter Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?), Mark Andrews Re: [saag] Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?), Henry B (Hank) Hotz, CISSP Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?), Nico Williams Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?), Eric Burger Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?, Fernando Gont Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?, Dave Crocker Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?, joel jaeggli Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?, Fernando Gont Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?, joel jaeggli

Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?)