Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?

On 8/24/14 7:10 AM, Fernando Gont wrote:
> On 08/23/2014 06:05 PM, Bernard Aboba wrote:
> > > However, say we're wrong and someone who thinks OS is a waste
> > > of time is actually correct, what would such a person recommend
> > > that we do as well as, or instead of, OS?
> > [BA] It depends on who we are trying to protect, and from what (or whom).  
> >
> > If the target is protection of dissidents from oppressive regimes, then
> > you need something much more comprehensive than 'unauthenticated
> > opportunistic encryption" (e.g. along the lines of Tor). 
> It is quite often the case that, under oppressive regimes, using
> encryption technology will already flag you as "suspect" (if not
> "guilty"). So in that case, you'd probably want to use something
> probably want something more like a cover channel in those scenarios.
it's already implausible in many cases  to seperate the sheep from the
goats.

When was the last time you did a google search or accessed a twitter
feed in the clear?

> Cheers,

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