ietf
[Top] [All Lists]

Re: E-Mail Protocol Security Measurements

2015-10-31 00:06:52
On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 12:00:30PM +0100, Aaron Zauner wrote:

Starting up this thread again; our paper has been published today
open-access and our data-sets are currently in the process of being
published on scans.io.

The paper is available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1510.08646

In terms of scanning methodology there's nothing entirely new here
but we've collected TLS enumeration scans for all publicly available
e-mail servers (POP, IMAP, SMTP) on the Internet.

Thanks for the paper, it contains a substantial quantity of useful
information.

I am however rather disappointed by how some of the results are
interpreted, at least by non-experts:

    
http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/10/dont-count-on-starttls-to-automatically-encrypt-your-sensitive-e-mails/

    Offsetting that progress was a finding that about 770,000 SMTP
    servers associated with the Alexa top million list still failed
    to properly secure their systems. Only 82 percent of them
    supported TLS, and of those, only 35 percent were properly
    configured to allow one server to cryptographically authenticate
    itself to another.

What's missing here is that having trusted SSL certificates offers
zero protection for MTA-to-MTA SMTP.  Any time/money spend on such
certificates is essentially wasted.  Barring DANE or similar
out-of-band policy, certificates *cannot* protect MTA-to-MTA SMTP
from MITM attacks.

I cringe every time someone bemoans the lack of "valid" certificates
in SMTP, such certificates are largely a worthless fashion statement.
(Some domains have bilateral arrangements with business partners
to verify email traffic certificates, but these arrangements are
exceedingly rare).

STARTTLS is designed to thwart exactly one attack: *passive* wiretap.
It works as designed for just that attack.  It is not surprising
that active attacks can and do defeat STARTTLS,

Hence, DANE for SMTP and related efforts.  No mass-scale use of
end-to-end encryption is looming to save the day, so transport
security is finally getting the attention it deserves.  My DANE
survey is at 9000 domains and counting, with adoption picking up
the pace a bit lately.  Some domain hosting providers have implemented
tens of thousands of additional DANE domains that do not show up
in my surveys.  It is still very early in the process, but I am
cautiously optimistic.

-- 
        Viktor.

<Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread>