ietf
[Top] [All Lists]

Re: [GROW] Last Call: <draft-ietf-grow-blackholing-00.txt> (BLACKHOLE BGP Community for Blackholing) to Proposed Standard

2016-06-26 22:54:56
On 6/26/16 10:06 AM, John Kristoff wrote:
On Sun, 26 Jun 2016 16:31:17 +0000
joel jaeggli <joelja(_at_)gmail(_dot_)com> wrote:

It's not clear to me how that would even work. assuming for the sake
of arguement that the IXP by way of configured policy on the
route-server adds this community to a prefix.

Here is some detail on how DE-CIX implements it:

  <https://www.de-cix.net/products-services/de-cix-frankfurt/blackholing/>


At the the possible expense of belaboring my observation still further,
i'm aware of how the community is implemented, I'm on those fabrics.
What I wasn't and am not clear on is how that would lead to:

Nick

 In the case of route servers, blackholing turns the IXP into
 a legal target.

Job

I feel that this is not the appropiate forum to define what IXPs can,
can't, should and shouldn't in context of legal enforcement agencies.

Short of the IXP engaging in prefix hijacking, or unilaterally applying
the community to an existing prefix; the ixp is in not position to
black-hole traffic except on request of the sender of the desitnation
prefix. Likewise if you withdraw the prefix from the routeserver, the
blackhole goes away, unless the route-server is engaged in prefix hijacking.

I don't see either of those issues as serious threats. if you live under
a regime that considers prefix hijacking acceptable, the community adds
no capability that the exchange does not already have;they can afterall
change the nexthop today, announce whatever prefix you're willing to
accept and so on; any of those activities in most places would be
immediate grounds for depeering and departure.

John



Attachment: signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature

<Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread>