spf-discuss
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Re: SRS Question

2004-01-09 14:12:58
Meng Weng Wong wrote:

On Fri, Jan 09, 2004 at 01:25:53PM -0600, Jim Ramsay wrote:

| | And is there a better explanation about how a cookie should be used, or | should that be site-dependent? |
Each site makes up a secret.  The secret is used when making a cookie.
You put a cookie into the rewritten address to prevent open relaying.

That's what I expected, but does it matter (or will it matter according to the RFC) where that cookie is put within the rewritten envelope?

For example, should it be:

bounce-cookie-original#domain(_dot_)dom(_at_)forwarder(_dot_)dom

Or

bounce-original#domain(_dot_)dom-cookie(_at_)forwarder(_dot_)dom

Or does the server get to decide?

What about:

realusername-fwdfrom-original#domain(_dot_)dom-cookie(_at_)host(_dot_)name(_dot_)com?

or:

realusername-fwdsecure-asthuoei79880euf7i79e8u(_at_)host(_dot_)name(_dot_)com
(where 'asthuoei79880euf7i79e8u' is the original envelope encrypted by the forwarding host with a key only known to that host)

This would be most useful for utilities like TMDA or Procmail or other mail processing scripts which may forward things to other email accounts. They could then properly get a bounce and forward it on, and it could be done on a per-user basis (the server would not be forced to have a global "bounce-" alias set up).

Then again, why standardize this with an RFC at all? As far as I can see the criteria needed such that I can forward an email to a SPF-enabled server are as follows:

- The forwarding server MUST rewrite the envelope such that the domain part corresponds to the SPF record on the forwarding server instead of the original sender's domain.

- This rewritten envelope MUST include a secure method of ensuring no one can forged similar rewritten envelopes

- The forwarding server MUST be able to receive emails to the envelope created above and change them back to the exact original only if the secure mechanism signifies that the address in question was not forged.

This means that the original envelope need not be visibly in the rewritten envelope - it could be stored on disk or in a database, or encrypted to make things more difficult to forge.

--
Jim Ramsay

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