On Tue, 2005-05-10 at 14:21 +0200, Julian Mehnle wrote:
The problem with that is that the ability to make such an assertion ("full
and complete trust") is rarely useful in real life.
It's very useful in this case, and I believe that's what matters here.
Generally internal MTA's fully trust their border MTAs not to lie,( and
they know who these trusted MTA's are), but there's no way for an MUA
reading the mail that passed through the internal MTA where the internal
trust border ended.
An X-Trust-Previous-Hop: header lets an MTA document whether it fully
trusts the previous MTA not to lie. That's information the MTA already
knows, but is generally hidden from the end user.
I merely want an easy, standard way for MTA's to document this
information, which IMHO would be very useful for an MUA or even a human
to have.
--
Mark Shewmaker
mark(_at_)primefactor(_dot_)com
770-933-3250