From: Brad Spencer <brad(_dot_)madison(_at_)mail(_dot_)tds(_dot_)net>
...
Not yet. Code doesn't write itself, code doesn't distribute itself. ...
...
I wish you the best of luck building a better honeypot.
Ain't gonna happen. There may be far better ways of dealing with abuse;
open proxy honeypots have barely begun and hold great promise, but I won't
be doing them. As I understand it this is an engineering task force,
although loose-knit. At some point a decision to act should occur and then
I'd think the ideas would be examined. My idea has a lot going for it:
...
See http://groups.google.com/groups?q=brad+honeypot+group%3A*abuse
for a couple thousand statements along those lines since early 2001.
There are a several distinct and independent anti-spam mechanisms in
current use that each prevents the delivery of 10 to several 100 times
more spam every day day than all intentional honeypots have captured
in their combined histories. I doubt it is a coincidence that none
of those mechanisms have the deployment, potential for abuse, narrow
application, and other problems of honeypots.
Spam honeypots are like teregrubing and security honeypots. They
should be in any comprehensive list of tools, but they are not
solutions. They can be useful research and detection tools, but
except for research and support, they are not part of the fix.
Note that for years I've been running systems that appear to spammers
like one of the kinds of honeypots that Brad Spencer has advocated
(the kind that does not deliver any spam including possible relay
tests and so does not abuse anyone or the network).
Vernon Schryver vjs(_at_)rhyolite(_dot_)com
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