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Re: [Asrg] Spam Control Complexity -- scaling, adoption, diversit y and scenarios [evidence for legal actions]
2003-04-23 11:21:48
Kee Hinckley wrote:
At 9:49 AM +0200 4/23/03, Andrzej Filip wrote:
Sigh. Time to buy another disk I guess.
Tapes may be more suitable for the task.
How many messages from <> to non existing local users YOUR site
bounces per day ?
I don't know, my mail system only logs the RCPT address in the bounce
info.
I'm currently averaging 30 bounces a minute, with a peak of 96 in the
last 24 hours. I've seen as high as 700 per minute though. That's on
a site with no more than a dozen or so real email addresses.
http://www.somewhere.com/mrtg/smtp-reject.html
Actual bounce-back used to be worse when we were a common forged
address. I could get thousands a minute if AOL's servers were getting
hit.
You have provided a convincing proof that recording bounces sent to
nonexisting addresses on your sytem does make a difference.
But anyway you talk about 1/2 messsage per second (on average), less
than 2 messages per second in peak and 43000 messages per day.
I think (and hope) that your system situation is not typical.
Are you ready to tell in public that you do not give a dam about who
fakes sender addresses in your email domain ?
I used to. I don't anymore. It's kind of like littering. I'd like
it to stop, but I'm not going to try and track every piece of litter
to the source--just the big abusers. Keep in mind, I'm a special
case. Millions of people forge somewhere.com.
It is sad that I can understand you :(
Unfortunately the fact that I know who they are doesn't help me at
all. Axis (internet-enabled video cameras). Microsoft (FrontPage
templates). They forged it. I'm suffering the consequences. Now what?
If you want to look at legal requirements. Give me a way of going
after someone for forging my domain where I can claim more than just
lost time as my damages. Then you won't need to require people to
store bounce-back--they'll have an incentive.
I hope that the legal system is capable to punish big systematic
abusers, I know it will take "some" time.
There is a chance that spammers will prefer to forge addresses in
domains without such records I suggested ;-)
--
Andrzej [pl>en: Andrew] Adam Filip http://www.polbox.com/a/anfi/
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- RE: [Asrg] Spam Control Complexity -- scaling, adoption, diversit y and scenarios, (continued)
- RE: [Asrg] Spam Control Complexity -- scaling, adoption, diversit y and scenarios, Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- RE: [Asrg] Spam Control Complexity -- scaling, adoption, diversit y and scenarios, Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [Asrg] Spam Control Complexity -- scaling, adoption, diversit y and scenarios, Dave Crocker
- Re: [Asrg] Spam Control Complexity -- scaling, adoption, diversit y and scenarios [evidence for legal actions], Andrzej Filip
- Re: [Asrg] Spam Control Complexity -- scaling, adoption, diversit y and scenarios [evidence for legal actions], Kee Hinckley
- Re: [Asrg] Spam Control Complexity -- scaling, adoption, diversit y and scenarios [evidence for legal actions], Andrzej Filip
- Re: [Asrg] Spam Control Complexity -- scaling, adoption, diversit y and scenarios [evidence for legal actions], Vernon Schryver
- Re: [Asrg] Spam Control Complexity -- scaling, adoption, diversit y and scenarios [evidence for legal actions], Andrzej Filip
- Re: [Asrg] Spam Control Complexity -- scaling, adoption, diversit y and scenarios [evidence for legal actions], Kee Hinckley
- Re: [Asrg] Spam Control Complexity -- scaling, adoption, diversit y and scenarios [evidence for legal actions],
Andrzej Filip <=
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