Yakov,
Escuse my brevity.
I'm still where Berry left off. I don't see anything in humans, or pseudo
humans, headers and eventual administrative DoS that solves for "virally
acquired spam slave servers".
Lets analyze where spam comes from. From experience I have seen the
following sources:
There is a taxonomy, most of which I've characterized as "slow", and then
there is
... spammers using slave servers.
Based on this, I will have to agree with you that spoofing or solving
spoofing will not solve the spam problem. It seems that we have to look at
the spam problem as a subset of a larger problem of how to prevent a
network user from abusing the network resources, in this cases being the
bandwidth.
Hold that thought. It's not unqualified bandwidth. Not only is it SMTP,
but it has some immediacy property that is distinct from say, 3rd-party
persistent cookies and their replay times to namespaces dynamically
managed by technically capable advertizing networks, and it must possess
some additional properties.
very easy and cheap for any network user to utilize the network resources.
Thus the solution is to make it expensive or restrict the user ...
Hold that thought too. There is no user. His or her wintel box on a cdn
or dsl circuit is _yours_. You simply need to match your acquisition and
loss budgets, while working your delivery problem.
The only thing that will help in these instances is either putting a
sending limit on the user, or using some kind of a secure operating system
which (in theory) makes it impossible to monitor local SMTP traffic. No
Hold that thought too. Is a node that transits from "nothingness" to "being"
indetectible?
[2] http://www.unc.edu/depts/jomc/academics/dri/idog.html
Thanks for the link!
You're welcome.
Eric
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