From: Eric Brunner-Williams in Portland Maine <brunner(_at_)nic-naa(_dot_)net>
To: "Jon Kyme" <jrk(_at_)merseymail(_dot_)com>
...
Of course the *sender* isn't aware (in advance) that this particular
3rd party is handling the mail.
I'm not sure the SpamArrest crime qualifies as a privacy issue for the
sender. As a sender, you can't know whether the recipient of your mail
will respect its privacy. Must every recipient of mail publish some
kind of policy that will be "certified" by an officious uselessness like
TrustE in the U.S? Even if it is an issue for the sender, it seems the
recipient is on the hook for preventing abuses like SpamArrest's.
...
That would be nice. No negative privacy impact is a "requirement".
The vagueness of this concerns me.
That it is an impossible to satisfy requirement bothers me.
Many spam defenses involve consulting third parties. For examples,
consulting third parties for authentication, to determine whether a
message is bulk, or whether the sender is an infamous spammer are
fundamental to many spam defenses. In each case, the question
itself divulges information that can be very sensitive. For example,
knowing that bill(_dot_)gates(_at_)microsoft(_dot_)com received a message from
steve(_dot_)jobs(_at_)apple(_dot_)com might be turned into a lot of money on
the stock
market. Letting the FBI know that O(_dot_)binLaden(_at_)example(_dot_)com
received a
message from you could get you an indefinite secret confinement.
As with security, nothing it perfect. What we can and must do is
minimize and fully disclose the privacy problems of spam defense.
Vernon Schryver vjs(_at_)rhyolite(_dot_)com
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