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Re: [Asrg] Re: 3. Requirements document

2003-09-26 13:22:49
Hi,

FIRST, I will be away for a few days and will try to answer this in detail when I get back.

SECOND, off hand I think this fits within the consent model that the group has been chartered to create expect with several restrictions such as no communications with the senders re: consent, and no standardization. I think that a small document summarizing your thoughts would serve as a useful tool around which we can center the discussion.

Yakov


gep2(_at_)terabites(_dot_)com wrote:

How would you suggest that recipients would go about granting and

denying permissions (or consent) if there are no standards in place? I think that that is an issue to be described by the documentation for the software involved, and/or the online help files that accompany it. I don't think there needs to be ANY worldwide consensus on how that needs to be done.

What's more, it might well be COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE to our case just as it's counter-productive for so many people to be using the same Outlook and Outlook Express E-mail clients; it just gives spammers a common, familiar base to find and exploit "universal" weaknesses in.

Since in a "proper" (IMHO) recipient-chosen, recipient-controlled system there is NO need for senders to interact directly with the recipient's chosen software (other than just by existing SMTP/POP protocols) I don't think there's any pressing need whatsoever for a worldwide permissions-and-control "standard" for interacting globally with these programs. I believe that the market itself will sort these things out, to the extent the need to be, in a relatively short time.

I think what's the MOST important is that we get SOMETHING out that significantly helps the recipient users, and soon enough that it's still of value to them.


Are you suggesting that the receiver simply chooses not to receive certain

kinds of email and that email starts to bounce? I think the recipient ought to have the choice of how to deal with certain types of messages. "Bounce it" might be one option, although probably not a good one since there are NO guarantees that there is even a valid POP3 mailbox at the sender end (and even so, that it's possible to determine what that POP3 E-mail address might be... clearly, a LOT of spam and viruses go out with forged/bogus sender addresses, as we've seen recently).

I believe that in general, either just t-canning (or holding in limbo for some time period, pending triage and final resolution) is probably a better approach overall. I think that the best approach for most spam and virus mails, and with ultimately the lowest total cost to the Net, is to simply route them all (commensurate with the recipient's established and specified permissions rules) down a black hole, and the sooner the better after they're sent.


If so, there is still a need to have some form of a format or standard in

place that the receiver can use to communicate his consent decisions to his MUA, MTA or ISP.

I don't think that that needs to be the result of a worldwide standard, in part since the capabilities of different permissions list implementing systems are likely to be VERY different, and may result in having quite different needs to control those capabilities.

For example, some of these filters might be implemented by Web-based tools, and others might be based on E-mail-type control commands. These two methods are likely to be (even VERY!) different. These are the types of things which individual ISPs and software providers are likely to use for 'product differentiation' that will give one ISP or software an edge over another. I don't think these NEED to be the result of a 'standards' effort.

Gordon Peterson                  http://personal.terabites.com/
1977-2002  Twenty-fifth anniversary year of Local Area Networking!
Support the Anti-SPAM Amendment!  Join at http://www.cauce.org/
12/19/98: Partisan Republicans scornfully ignore the voters they "represent".
12/09/00: the date the Republican Party took down democracy in America.



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