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Re: [Asrg] "worm spam" and SPF

2004-11-27 22:37:47
As everyone probably knows, there is a pretty large outbreak going on 
right now. According to our mail filters at http://aves.f-prot.com,
10.56% of all filtered E-mail contains W32/Sober(_dot_)J(_at_)mm(_dot_)  In 
addition,
there is a significant number of bounces as well.  

We've reached 1.5 GB an hour of this s**t since Tuesday. Only our AV 
calls it Sober(_dot_)I(_at_)mm(_dot_)

I agree, bounces are the very evil of the net itself.

Bouncing "infected" mail makes NO sense.

Most of the time, the mail is bounced to a counterfeit/bogus "from" address 
where it COMPOUNDS the damage done by the worm, either by mailbombing someone 
who is THEMSELVES a victim, or at least their ISP.  I've also had bounces go 
back to Yahoogroups (a major mailer, to say the least) who then disables MY 
E-mail address because "their" mail to me "hard bounced".  :-((

A-V software, AT A MINIMUM, should NEVER bounced "infected" mail for cases 
where 
the recognized virus/worm in the mail being bounced is KNOWN to use counterfeit 
From: addresses!

Where I'd have to disagree is here:

* Doing SPF checking will block the vast majority of the worms, but it
  will not help with the bounces or the filter alerts.

It may block the vast majority of current worms, but I doubt it would 
stop the tide for long. VX-ers will find other ways of abusing infected 
victims.. they might even send out email using the user's own email account 
and/or email client.

Absolutely, and that's precisely why SPF (like the other equally braindead 
certification/identification schemes) is a non-solution for this problem.  
Virus/worm authors can (literally overnight) shift to using the real E-mail 
address belonging to the person whose machine they've infected, and just as 
quickly all their worm/spam messages will fly through SPF (and similar) 
domain-certification checks.  :-(  So we would have spent YEARS arguing over 
and 
maybe finally agreeing on and implementing something that literally overnight 
is 
rendered useless.  (And you know, the spammers love to get the last laugh like 
that, making everyone else look like the clueless idiots they are).

As long as there are huge drone armies out there, and their likes - I 
don't see how spam solutions today would really work as people hope. 

There is ONE solution that virtually eliminates the worm/virus problem.  And 
that is the simple, effective, fine-grained permissions list... where the 
default is to (by default) not accept messages that:  (1) are bigger than some 
limited size (say 10K-25K), (2) contain attachments, and/or (3) contain HTML. 
unless the trusted sender of those "enhanced" features has been approved to 
send 
those riskier/bulkier E-mail formats by the individual recipient.

There could be enhancements to make the grain finer, to discriminate based on 
TYPE of attachments and classes of HTML tags.

For most recipients, their default protections (accept executable attachments 
and HTML tags from NOBODY) would shield the recipient from virtually ALL e-mail 
propagation of worms and viruses.  It would also effectively prevent URL 
spoofing, where the link that shows "confirm.citibank.com" actually links 
unseen 
to some site like "spoof.youmoron.ro" or the like.

We can sit and argue about SPF and other authentication approaches for days, or 
weeks, or months, or even years, but the FACT of the matter is that until we 
get 
the virus/worm/zombie problem solved (and SPF does NOT do that), SPF (and ALL 
of 
its ilk) is damned near worthless.

Gordon Peterson                  http://personal.terabites.com/
1977-2002  Twenty-fifth anniversary year of Local Area Networking!
Support free and fair US elections!  http://stickers.defend-democracy.org
12/19/98: Partisan Republicans scornfully ignore the voters they "represent".
12/09/00: the date the Republican Party took down democracy in America.



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