Markus Stumpf wrote:
SPF does all this NOT and it breaks widely deployed Internet
Mail Infrastructure.
That's not true (a.k.a. a lie) following the spec. Receivers
just have to check it at the one hop from the last MTA of the
sender to the first MTA (MX) of the receiver, then it "breaks"
nothing, let alone the "Internet Mail Infrastructure".
Even if a receiver screws up badly and checks it later nothing
evil happens, the MTA in question rejects the mail, and the MTA
before it creates a bounce - that strikes me as a very complex
approximation of "551 user not local", but it's SMTP as defined
in STD 10 and later.
Second attempt to break anything, somebody wants a "bounces-to"
as in mail-arch, i.e. use a given MAIL FROM anywhere. That's
very simple, he just does not publish a sender policy, ready.
Without > 80% of all domains deploying SPF (and SRS) I will
never block based on SPF
That's your decision, SPF is a voluntary system, and the most
important volunteers are the spammers, not you.
this would be a MTAMARK like list
MTAMARK and SPF are unrelated. The only thing they might share
is the fact, that IPs marked as MTAs can be IPs of spammers,
like MAIL FROMs or HELOs resulting in a SPF PASS can be set up
by spammers.
Bye, Frank
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