On 1/19/11 1:00 PM, Chris Lewis wrote:
he says he has. Were he honest, instead of "your bacon was horrible,
pay me money or I'll shut you down" he would be threatening "your
bacon was horrible, pay me money or I'll list you on my list of places
where I didn't like the bacon."
The thing is, the random self-selected guy doesn't have all the power
In the DNSBL world, a popular blacklist listing can cause more than
50% of their email to get blocked in such a way that most recipients
don't know that it's happening. They've abruptly disappeared
email-wise, for a huge chunk of the Internet. This is far more than
midway between an end-user advisory that an end-user can choose to
ignore or accept, and a health-department mandated door shutting.
Chris,
Networks containing millions of individual sources of abuse are often
most effectively handled by policies enforced by their network
providers. Policies promoted by this draft overlook network provider's
role. Only network providers are able to block abuse and determine
whether abuse has been mitigated by their customer. Third-parties
monitoring network traffic see only a tiny fraction of any overall
abuse. Listing stratagems that aid list-washing techniques further
reduce the effectiveness of important third-party monitoring.
It seems this draft has a goal to make third-party monitoring
ineffective, and to avoid the corrective actions that may need to be
taken by network providers. It is not a mistake to list networks
replete with abuse. When a network provider is unwilling to stop
commerce of abuse (tainted bacon), listing their network gets their
attention. Their angry customers are free to seek services from other
responsive providers. The original abuse listings were distributed as
BGP filters. It seems future listings of IP addresses will likely need
to return to this model in order to scale to the larger IP address space.
Of course, positive reputations by domain name work well with DNS, and
would be independent of the network provider. It seems this draft
misses an opportunity to better lay out how services can be supported in
the future. We continually need to counter the erosion caused by
"automated" abuse listings and mailing-list washing. IPv6 will make
obscuring spam traps and selectively reacting to individual IP addresses
impossible. :^(
-Doug
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