On Mon, Jan 24, 2011 at 6:14 PM, Dotzero <dotzero(_at_)gmail(_dot_)com> wrote:
On Mon, Jan 24, 2011 at 5:37 PM, Douglas Otis
<dotis(_at_)mail-abuse(_dot_)org> wrote:
An SPF failure can not be trusted to be an indicator of spam. DKIM signing
is almost never assured, especially when handled by third-party services.
As such, these mechanisms failing alone or together still do not offer a
safe basis for rejection. Of course both passing means nothing as well.
Doug, there are plenty of people with real world operational
experience that would disagree with you. You state that failing means
nothing and passing means nothing. If that is true, why are there a
significant number of implementers using this approach successfully?
Hi Mike,
While I'm just catching up on this thread, I can also chime in that --
as far as I can tell, neither spf or dkim has had any impact on spam,
at least from what I can determine.
If that was the original intent of spf and/or dkim, then I would be
inclined to say that neither have properly addressed the spam problem.
$.02,
- ferg
--
"Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson
Engineering Architecture for the Internet
fergdawgster(at)gmail.com
ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/
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