Re: [ietf-dkim] Replay isn't the problem, spam is the problem
2005-08-09 06:49:03
John R Levine wrote:
Replay protection allows automated reputation management, since it
provides a signed proof of misconduct.
Oh, look, now we're back full circle. Please explain how your reply
protector can tell the difference between an evil replay and a normal
standard garden variety mailing list, short of some giant whitelist of
every mailing list forcing every piece of dusty mailing list software to
upgrade, or using the same heuristics we use now (which, of course, don't
need a DKIM replay detector to work.)
When we receive a message from forwarder/mailing list, it will normally
be without replay protection, just like with current DKIM. Recipient can
now determine how to handle it. Some may accept it - as in current DKIM
- I think that's acceptable policy. Others may restrict such messages to
known mailing lists etc., possibly using white/black lists, etc. Few
may flatly discard such mail; that is also an acceptable recipient
policy, even if a bit harsh.
I definitely don't expect every mailing list software to upgrade,
although I do envision an optional mechanism allowing a mailing list to
ask senders to pre-authorize distribution of their message to a specific
number of recipients in the list. However, I am not even sure we need to
define such mechanisms at this point.
You're also making the assumption that spammers will blast out many
identical messages with the same signature. They stopped doing that in
about 1999, and nobody's suggested what would make them resume doing so.
No I don't. DKIM may _motivate_ spammers to send the same messages,
signed by some victim sending domain, to many recipients. Replay
protection just protects the sending domains from losing their
reputation due to such risks, and the destinations from receiving such
spam on the basis of the reputation of the senders.
--
Best regards,
Amir Herzberg
Associate Professor
Department of Computer Science
Bar Ilan University
http://AmirHerzberg.com
Try TrustBar - improved browser security UI:
http://AmirHerzberg.com/TrustBar
Visit my Hall Of Shame of Unprotected Login pages:
http://AmirHerzberg.com/shame
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- Re: [ietf-dkim] What's a replay?, (continued)
- Re: [ietf-dkim] What's a replay?, Eric Allman
- Re: [ietf-dkim] What's a replay?, Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] What's a replay?, Tony Finch
- Re: [ietf-dkim] What's a replay?, Eric Allman
- Re: [ietf-dkim] What's a replay?, Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Replay isn't the problem, spam is the problem, Amir Herzberg
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Replay isn't the problem, spam is the problem, John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Replay isn't the problem, spam is the problem,
Amir Herzberg <=
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Replay isn't the problem, spam is the problem, John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Replay isn't the problem, spam is the problem, Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Replay isn't the problem, spam is the problem, Amir Herzberg
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Replay isn't the problem, spam is the problem, Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Replay isn't the problem, spam is the problem, Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Replay isn't the problem, spam is the problem, Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Replay isn't the problem, spam is the problem, Douglas Otis
- Re: DKIM implementations SHOULD support replay protection (was: Re: [ietf-dkim]Re: Replay attacks and ISP business models, Dave Crocker
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Re: Replay attacks and ISP business models, Amir Herzberg
[ietf-dkim] Re: Replay attacks and ISP business models, Douglas Otis
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