Dave, what is it exactly that you are suggested we agree to and why? Is it
that you want to make lookups on unsigned mail optional? What would doing
that achieve? We'd all still have to agree on how it gets done for the sake
of those who implement the optional. So, if your position is that the
additional complexity involved brings doom to the process, you can't escape
that by this move. Or, do you suggest we remove draft-allman-dkim-ssp as
input into the process completely?
--
Arvel
----- Original Message -----
From: "Dave Crocker" <dhc(_at_)dcrocker(_dot_)net>
To: <ietf-dkim(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org>
Sent: Sunday, August 14, 2005 11:36 AM
Subject: [ietf-dkim] a bit of philosophy on working group productivity
andscope
Folks,
> what is the most minimal enhancement that would make
> you happy TODAY?
>
> define requirements that dkim satisfies, without
> actually saying anything about the details of dkim itself.
>
Why the "most minimal" qualifier in your question? We are capable of
producing something more than the bare minimum.
Here is our current reality: As of this moment, it is not clear that we
are
capable of producing anything at all.
There is no existence proof for real success in this arena of
standardization. The DKIM effort has no track record of success in the
IETF.
Until we change that, we are working with hopes and dreams, not reality.
When an effort starts, the more difficult the topic and the more diverse
the
participation, the higher the risk of standardization failure. As with
any
high-risk project, the first goal needs to be to demonstrate usefulness,
ie,
success.
In the long run, we probably very much *can* produce something more than
the
bare minimum. Something a lot more.
But first we need to do *anything at all* that is useful.
That means targeting the smallest bit of useful output that we can agree
to, and
*later* building upon it.
As of today, there is no standardized transit-time message authentication
technique. If we can produce a standard that permits validating ANY
identity
with a signed message, we will have created a stable base for all sorts of
enhancements.
Enhancement obviously include: associating it will other identities in the
message, using the *absence* of a signature as significant with respect to
the
policies of some identity, determining the wonderfulness of the signing
identity
(ie, using standardized access to reputation and accreditation services),
and so
on.
Until we have the core mechanism of signing a message and validating that
signature, we have nothing but fantasy.
d/
---
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
+1.408.246.8253
dcrocker a t ...
WE'VE MOVED to: www.bbiw.net
_______________________________________________
ietf-dkim mailing list
ietf-dkim(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org
http://mipassoc.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim
_______________________________________________
ietf-dkim mailing list
<http://dkim.org>