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Re: [ietf-dkim] Not exactly not a threat analysis

2005-08-16 18:52:45
On August 16, 2005 at 18:13, Douglas Otis wrote:

When efforts to capture the RCPT TO prove expensive, this is only  
expensive for the sender, not the recipient.  Shifting burdens onto  
the sender is an excellent trade-off.  If each message created from  
the To or Bcc headers captured the RCPT TO separately and are then  
signed separately, this would not expose the Bcc list which would be  
stripped.  It would require that the signing process be located where  
messages are disseminated.

Nice justification for requiring senders to do the "split" instead
of receivers.

I was thinking of general bandwidth aspects.  It will increase network
bandwidth, for senders and receivers, but for a given message, a given
receiver bandwidth will be <= sender bandwidth.  I do not have enough
information to determine if bandwidth considerations will be a problem
or not (much will depend on existing behavior and the frequency of
multiple envelope recipients to the recipient-side MTA).

--ewh
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