I'm a little bit worried about the law of unintended consequences
here. Right now we have exactly two states: fully verifies, or
doesn't and is equivalent to no signature at all. What is the
ramification of allowing for a third state?
Indeed.
The power of the current, simple 2-state model cannot be overestimated, in my
opinion. We need to keep in mind that this is a mechanism for transit
validation, rather than something with broader scope.
There are myriad, clever enhancements that could be made to DKIM's
functionality. We need to firmly resist the temptation to pursue any of them at
this stage... unless there is a compelling argument for *immediate* community need.
After the first IETF version of DKIM is issued as a standard, we can consider
all of those fascinating enhancements.
Right now, the urgency is for a basic, standard mechanism that works.
d/
--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
<http://bbiw.net>
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