[mailto:ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Tony Hansen
I don't like being a guinea pig, but that's what it feels
like with the discussions on how to go about upgrading
algorithms. I don't think we know enough yet to even know how
to begin. This is a problem that a variety of protocols are
going to go through, so we are *not* alone (and
*shouldn't* be alone) in trying to figure out how to do it.
Actually there is a major difference. We have almost complete
flexibility here and almost no legacy base to defend.
Our problem is much much easier than anyone else's. We can avoid the
need for a SHA 256 transition by making it a base requirement and we can
build in a transition strategy into the base.
Another major advantage we have uniquely is that we have a policy
record. The lack of security policy information is a major reason that
existing security protocols are difficult to upgrade and prone to
downgrade attack.
I think that we will find others are looking at us to see if they can
copy our solution.
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