Dave Crocker <dhc(_at_)dcrocker(_dot_)net> writes:
Eric, et al,
Eric Rescorla wrote:
> If we have two algorithms, Old and New, then there are three
> kinds of signer and receiver, respectively: Old, New, and Both.
> This gives us a 3-3 interop matrix, with four possibilities at
> each cell:
In the interest of exploring a simplification, let me re-raise a
perspective that has been expressed by others:
It is important to be able to have multiple signatures, for transition
issues, to make sure that the signer and validator share at least one,
common algorithms. That is the *only* concern about multiple
signatures.
One can take the position that question of "strength" is almost
completely irrelevant.
Here's why:
The validator either considers a signature "strong" enough or they
don't. That choice is the validator's and it does not matter in the
least whether the signer agrees.
If someone does a downplay attack, the validator might be looking at a
signature that is "weaker" but it won't matter. Either the validator
will consider it strong enough or they won't.
So, my question is: what is wrong with this view of the issue?
In this context, I think nothing.
-Ekr
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