ietf-dkim
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Re: [ietf-dkim] Proposal: get rid of x=

2006-04-06 18:14:40

(A message from the in-two-minds department:-)

Michael Thomas wrote:
Paul Hoffman wrote:
Note that the informative note only says what x= is not. Leaving x= in can also lead to silly states.

What states might those be?

I was also wondering about that. I guess that "x=" is a way to make
it crystal clear that this signature is (probably, potentially)
totally worthless in some court case in 5 years time - a v. good
feature (*). It would also help if someone wanted to auto-generate
new signing key-pairs at about the latency with which their DNS
stuff becomes available (but I don't know if that info's available
to the verifier via DNS - is it?). Were we to ask verifiers to
interpret "x=" as guidance, and not as a way in which it MUST
fail a signature, then its optional inclusion may well help some
layer above DKIM.

However, on Paul's side of the argument, it is true that many, if
not most, people recognize that insisting upon X.509 certificates
having to have a notAfter date was a mistake. So, there is a bit of
prima-fasciae evidence that signed-things-with-stupid-expiry-values
are problematic in some cases, though that analogy really holds much
better against the key record and not the signature. To be concrete
about problems-ensuing: I guess if an MUA were DKIM-aware then "x="
creates a dilemma for the MUA programmer in cases where the mail
isn't read until after the relevant time. I also remember trying
to shoe-horn a Kerberos thing into being usable on an extranet - the
clock skew was such a killer that we had to open the window to
ridiculous levels.

Basically, YMMV!

But, facts outweigh opinions: are there specific verifier uses
cases that act upon the "x=" value?

Stephen.

(*) <rant now="y"> If "x=" survives and becomes practically used
by verifiers then I would encourage DKIM implementers who *really*
want their signatures to be worthless at some point in the future
to agree to publish their old private keys a little while after they
are finished with using those private keys. Giving everyone the
means to repudiate old transactions is IMO an excellent way to
prevent a lawyer/<<thing>> from pretending that you meant a
signature to be some kind of pseudo-non-repudiable thing!
</rant>


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