Jonathan Clark wrote:
So *should* we continue to think of DKIM as being transit-only?
It seems like there is value in allowing MUAs to re-validate messages
long after they are received in a mailbox, and to be able to distinguish
between cases such as:
...
The overhead would be to keep old keys lying around in the DNS forever,
and perhaps some more metadata.
1. That's quite a large bit of overhead.
2. "seems like there is value" seems a bit vague. What do you see as the
compelling benefit to be obtained from this? How would it be useful to make the
distinctions you list?
3. Is there any reason that this enhanced requirement could not be added later,
so that the initial benefits and burden of DKIM are kept more focused during
initial adoption and deployment?
d/
--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
<http://bbiw.net>
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