Re: [ietf-dkim] Today's jabber #1271: Binary algorithms and algorithm spoofing during a transition.
2006-05-18 15:52:04
On May 18, 2006, at 1:59 PM, Eric Allman wrote:
Doug, I think you have assumed that we have accepted your
suggestion that all future algorithms will be represented by
number. I, at least, have not.
The critical aspect of the algorithm representation is to ensure
there is no opportunity for exploitation during a subsequent
algorithm transition. Semantics must allow a verifier a method to
confirm that the signer has offered a key with an unknown algorithm
that matches the DKIM signature header field with an unknown
algorithm. Key algorithm representation == Signature algorithm
representation.
When the query method indicates q=x, y; there could be conflicts
where one algorithm's representation in the key is a number, and
where the other method's representation within the key is a
mnemonic. Unknown mnemonic representations can not be mapped to a
number.
One solution could have future algorithms represented as a number to
avoid possible conflicts between mnemonic and number representations
of algorithms. An exception can be made where known mnemonics can be
mapped to known numbers.
Of course, the binary key could use a mnemonic to represent the
algorithm. This added overhead may reduce how well this key extends
for other uses, or might be less compliant with other protocols where
numeric representations for the algorithm are common. : (
You also seem to have missed my point about Posix. Defining an
abstract set of semantics and then doing a concrete profile (in
this case, for the representation) looks great in theory, but for
creating specs there is at least one datum that says the opposite.
The base draft could be explicit and use the q= dns, dnsrr with
definitions then referencing other drafts for full dependence. This
would simplify future updates where when perhaps just the TXT draft
is obsoleted there is little affect on the base draft, for example.
Not fully sharing your concern, better independence is achieved where
a token is used as a placeholder such as 1*(query-method-designator).
query-method-designator: see rfc-xxxx and rfc-xxxx.
The TXT draft could become a common template for the binary RR and
other future drafts. An abstraction is not required, although it
should not be difficult to understand. A place holder seems cleaner
and would help keep straight which tags are contained in the
signature and which are in the key.
If the base-draft stays the same, then the issue of algorithm
representation still needs to be resolved for the TXT and future
mechanisms.
Is there to be only one query mechanism per algorithm representation?
If all algorithms have a common representation, should this be
numeric or mnemonic?
Perhaps a=x,y; q=j,k; where algorithm x goes with query method j,
and y goes with k. There are many ways this can be resolved.
Just to be clear: my proposal is that we leave -base as is. One
part of the DKK spec will be a mapping from the new binary form to
the DKK form and vice versa.
This mapping must allow for unknown algorithms. It is not a simple
matter unless semantics provide a consistent means to confirm what
algorithm has been offered by the signer, or the transition period
allows undetected removal of the non-deprecated signature
algorithms. A bad actor could simply invent algorithms when pointing
to a new key, where the verifier is unable to confirm the algorithm
within the key does not match the algorithm found in the DKIM
signature header field. Ensuring this confirmation is always
possible, thwarts any attempt at a spoofing the offered algorithm.
This spoof could be detected prior to the verifier being updated and
seems simple to achieve.
Although splitting the draft seems cleaner, retaining the TXT record
within the base still needs the minor detail of algorithm
representation sorted out. Tagging keys as deprecated should also be
defined, but this has a lesser impact on future semantic compatibility.
-Doug
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- Re: [ietf-dkim] Today's jabber, (continued)
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Today's jabber, Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Today's jabber, Mark Delany
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Today's jabber, Eric Allman
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Today's jabber #1271: Binary algorithms and algorithm spoofing during a transition., Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Today's jabber #1271: Binary algorithms and algorithm spoofing during a transition., Eric Allman
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Today's jabber #1271: Binary algorithms and algorithm spoofing during a transition., Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Today's jabber #1271: Binary algorithms and algorithm spoofing during a transition.,
Douglas Otis <=
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Today's jabber, Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] Today's jabber, Douglas Otis
Re: [ietf-dkim] Today's jabber, Eric Allman
Re: [ietf-dkim] Today's jabber, william(at)elan.net
Re: [ietf-dkim] Today's jabber, John Levine
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