Re: DKIM TTPs (was Re: [ietf-dkim] editorials and nits)

On Jul 6, 2006, at 7:20 PM, Eliot Lear wrote:

> > While a service need not monolithic, the criteria established for  
> > the RA in your example likely was based upon tangible entities.   
> > If there was a problem, there would also be meaningful recourse.   
> > DNS domain delegations and email interactions are orthogonal from  
> > a trust standpoint.  While DNS could be called at TTP with respect  
> > to domain delegations (to and by often anonymous entities), with  
> > respect to email interactions, trust is missing.  When DKIM is  
> > based upon DNS keys, either pre-arranged acceptance (white- 
> > listing), or some other trusted third-party remains essential for  
> > secure email interactions.
> I don't see how you get here.  First of all, why is trust missing  
> with respect to email interactions?
The CA identification process helps prevent anonymous behaviors.   
When dealing with a CA or a list of CAs, the CA selection is often  
based upon trust of their vetting process, hence the term trusted  
third-party.  As a result, the receiving party, CA, and a legal  
system are better able to mitigate bad behaviors. In other words,  
there is a moderate amount of recourse afforded when only trusted CAs  
are consulted to secure interactions.
In the case of an SSL server certificate for commerce, the CA can be  
trusted to:
- Confirm entity registration identification which includes location
- Confirm the domain is owned or controlled by the registering entity
- a 3rd party confirms the requester is an authorized agent of  
registering entity
> There is already a reliance on DNS because of MX records, and so  
> there already needs to be an established relationship between the  
> domain  administrator and the mail administrator.
DNS provides a delegation process starting at root resolving to a  
name server located by domain name.  There may not be any out-of-band  
information freely offered identifying the controlling entity's  
identity.  It is common for delegations of just one domain name to  
involve from dozens to hundreds of different entities, where again  
little is assured with respect to any of the delegating entity's  
identity either.
A delegation process is not the same as trusting a vetting process  
that specifically provides a tangible identity of the controlling  
entity.  In the case of DNS, there is _no_ selective trust involved.   
When this process involves hundreds of thousands of often anonymous  
entities, it seems rather misleading to describe that process as a  
"trusted third-party."  Expected to resolve a domain name is not the  
same as trusted to vet the identity of the controlling entity, an  
expectation invoked by the term "trusted third-party" and illustrated  
by the definition.

> There are, typically, not countless interactions that then occur,  
> but the number of DNS delegations worth of interactions, and for  
> outside the organization that is typically two, and they're  
> anything but anonymous.
This represents an underestimate of the problem.

See:
http://www.cs.cornell.edu/People/egs/beehive/dnssurvey.html

Limited access of whois:
http://www.pfir.org/statements/whois-access

Not anonymous?
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress03/farnan090403.htm
"As I’ve indicated, sometimes the Whois data is inaccurate,  
incomplete, outdated, or deliberately falsified."
The whois information can _not_ be trusted even when it is available!


> While the level of trust one invests in DNS is always a matter of  
> judgment, depending on how paranoid one wants to be about each of  
> the delegations one could use DNSSEC, if/when it becomes available  
> for a given zone.
DNSSEC improves the integrity of the delegation process and exchange  
of resource records.  It does not improve upon extremely poor  
identification vetting that might not even be available to the  
recipient.  The untrustworthy identification associated with DNS  
means it is very misleading to describe DNS as a trusted third-party  
analogous to a trusted CA.

> All of this having been said, your use of the words "secure email  
> interactions" overstates the purpose of the method.
This comment used terminology offered by the definition provide by  
Stephen.  Indeed DNS does not offer a reasonable method to exclude  
bad actors (secure), where a trusted third-party does.
-Doug



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