ietf-dkim
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Re: Fwd: Re: [ietf-dkim] Introducing myself

2006-12-07 03:35:35
On Wed, 06 Dec 2006 20:25:39 -0000, John Levine <johnl(_at_)iecc(_dot_)com> 
wrote:

But of course I don't want them to be "likely to survive". I want a system
that is robust enough that they "always survive".

As I recall, we agreed that is specifically not a goal of DKIM.  If
you want a signing scheme designed to survive all sorts of hostile
gateways, there's already S/MIME.  The limited c18n in DKIM is
intended to survive only the most common sorts of transit relays.

Unfortunately, S/MIME already suffers from exactly the same bug^H^H^Hfeature, which is why I was surprised to see that DKIM has followed that same broken path.

DKIM will have no effect on the present spam/phishing/malware scene unless it is widely adopted. It will not be widely adopted unless it is seen to be robust. In particular, it will not be adopted in countries (esp those in Asia) where the character sets used are totally unlike ASCII if it can only be made to work by forcing everything to be sent as 7bit. They just cannot survive in an environment where textual messages 'on the wire' cannot easily be read in that form. They will just resort to "send 8bits anyway" which is already happening, even with headers, to a large extent, because 99.9% of the time it actually works like that without problem.

That is why the parallel EAI effort has been mentined so often in these discussions, because it is pulling in exactly the opposite direction to this WG, and it is the Chinese and the Japanese who are pulling the hardest.

Honestly, I'd be more inclined to go in the other direction and
deprecate the relaxed body c18n, since it is my impression that the
simple one works in practice for nearly any message that relaxed does,
and relaxed is more complicated and may be vulnerable to ASCII art
hacks.

It has been standard practice in PGP, since its inception, to ignore trailing whitespace (unless you explicitly ask it not to). I have never heard of a Bad Guy who managed to create a correctly signed message message with usefully different content by taking advantage of that.

--
Charles H. Lindsey ---------At Home, doing my own thing------------------------
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