(Just background for Damon, and anyone else in the same frame of mind,
nothing SSP or DKIM specific here).
On Dec 11, 2006, at 7:52 AM, Damon wrote:
Since you brought it up...
No mailing list (or other _ Spam_ ) corruption of an email in transit
_or just plain spam_ can do anything worse than change the delivery of
a legitimate _or purposely munged_, DKIM-signed email into the
delivery of a legitimate _or more likely illegitimate_ non-DKIM-signed
email.
It's not until you hang the SSP bag on the side that this has any
_positive_
snip<negative> impact on _<il>_legitimate email usage.
Cheers,
Steve
The volume of spam is now -- what-- 7 out of 10?
Doesn't BAD=NOSIG seem, even a little, useless... Especially at the
cost of decoding it at our current volume levels?
Were you around for the fiasco that was SPF?
That's where a lot of our operational experience of throwing away
perfectly good mail, simply because it wasn't transmitted in a way
that followed the dogma of the message signers came from.
It was, basically, a failure, in that the SPF policies (which are very
much equivalent to SSP) that are published are almost "?all",
which is pretty much equivalent to "I sign some things" in SSP
speak.
People wouldn't tolerate mail being thrown away for
no good reason, nor were even the developers of SPF prepared
to modify the way in which they forwarded email around in order
to work around the flaws of SPF.
There seems to be some belief that if SSP does exactly the same
thing as SPF then we'll pull the phishing-proof, spam-resistant
mail architecture out of the hat this time.
Cheers,
Steve
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