[mailto:ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Dave Crocker
1. If the signer publishes support for multiple algorithms,
then the publisher supports those algorithms. If they made
poor choices, that's their problem.
The term 'poor choice' is POV.
What you mean here is 'poor choice from the practical point of view'. The new
algorithms is almost certainly going to be a better point of view from the
cryptographic point of view or why change?
So what you are saing is that if someone wants to migrate from SHA-1 to SHA-256
or the equivalent then that's the problem for the publisher rather than the
working group charged with engineering a system here.
That's nonsense.
Doing something that causes a signature to fail is something
I class as a downgrade.
That is not the security area definition of a downgrade attack. A downgrade
attack is when the attacker gains a more favorable outcome by causing a party
to accept a lower degree of security than they should expect.
The only purpose of a security policy mechanism is to prevent a downgrade
attack.
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