ietf-dkim
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Re: creeping i= (was RE: [ietf-dkim] Responsibility vs. Validity)

2007-11-29 16:40:23

On Nov 29, 2007, at 12:43 PM, J D Falk wrote:

Doug Otis opined:

That's a ton of extra work, for very little benefit (from an anti- spam point of view.)

No. With there being so many bots, it is common to find a large domain sending a fairly high level of spam. It would be helpful if there were a means to mitigate spam from such a domain without blocking the entire domain.

I agree, that would be extremely helpful -- but DKIM's i= won't give it to us. (Unless you're assuming that these same botnet operators will allow themselves to be corralled into a single identifer, which clearly isn't the case.)

The provider might limit i= annotation to those accounts specifically assigned the particular email-address. This would not be easy, however RFC2554/4954 and RFC4409 provide a foundation for such a mechanism. It might be easier to use opaque identifiers, where SSP policy indicates these identifiers relate to an account granted access. This assertion could look something like scope=F-a. Either scope=F-i or scope=F-a would be making an assertion about what is being authenticated. Scope=F (the default) would indicate the DKIM signature is independent of access/email-address identity authentications.

Scott Kitterman responded:

Then find a solution other than DOMAIN Keys Identified Mail for that problem. A user level reputation system is going to be at least an order of magnitude harder than domain reputation and we really don't have the domain level problem figured out yet.

+1

This information still allows valuable message annotations to better protect individuals from intra-domain spoofing. Intra-domain spoofing would be a greater problem for large domains. Such authentication assertion could indicate whether the recipient should even attempt to validate the signature when faced with too many abusive replays.

When a signing domain fails to offer some intra-domain identifier, bots and replay abuse may make validating DKIM signatures unable to justify the resources required. Some intra-domain identifier, opaque or otherwise, could provide a practical means to deal with an abuse problem. The alternative is the reputation of SMTP client IP address. While larger domains represent less that 15% percent of the all email-sources, these large domains also represent more than 90% of the total message volume. Bots are leveraging this situation in a major way.

-Doug
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