ietf-dkim
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Re: [ietf-dkim] NEW ISSUE: Signature semantics

2007-12-11 19:52:01
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On Dec 9, 2007, at 9:23 AM, Dave Crocker wrote:



6. Signature Semantics
DKIM was devised to provide a means of declaring an  
(organization's) identity
that is taking "responsibility" for placing a message into the  
transit stream.
This is a very constrained semantic for the signature, and really  
pertains to
no more than a delivery decision.
In reviewing the apparent semantics of full SSP use, I believe it  
seeks to
move a DKIM signature, which uses the same domain name as is in  
the From
field, into the realm of declaring content to be valid.  This is a  
much more
demanding semantic and, I believe, moves the DKIM/SSP service into  
direct
competition with S/MIME and PGP.  At best, this seems entirely ill- 
advised.
At the least, it is considerably more ambitious than the initial  
functions
discussed for SSP.  For an initial version of a standard, more  
ambitious means
more risky.


To the extent that the above is not sufficiently clear:

     As discussion on the mailing list this past week has made  
clear, there is continuing working group disparity about the  
semantics of using DKIM, with or without SSP.  The use of SSP's  
handling options clearly moves things into statements about message  
content.  This exceeds the semantics for which DKIM was designed.   
See, for example:

   <http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2007q4/008136.html>

Before SSP can be stabilized the working group must reach consensus  
on basic issues of semantics for the mechanism.


Since I'm being quoted, I'm not sure if I should give a quick comment  
or not. I don't believe that DKIM/SSP can come into competition with  
OpenPGP or S/MIME, even if that became an explicit goal.

The issue is mandatory end-user identification with i=. Now, Jim  
Fenton called me on the phone after that, and explained that there  
are some uses (like using g= for delegation) of i= where the signer  
is not at liberty to put anything they want there. I'm not concerned  
with that. I'm also not saying that an administrative domain *cannot*  
essentially have one key per user. My objection is with any language  
that dictates in the general case what the signer *must* put there,  
so that the receiver can depend on it.

        Jon



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