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Re: [ietf-dkim] ISSUE: 4871bis - Security Loop hole with Multiple 5322.From

2010-10-05 15:09:28
-----Original Message-----
From: ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org 
[mailto:ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Scott 
Kitterman
Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 2010 12:24 PM
To: ietf-dkim(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] ISSUE: 4871bis - Security Loop hole with Multiple 
5322.From

Nack. DKIM also purports to provide assurance that the signed content
of the message is unmodified. I think mentioning that all instances of
a header that is signed should be used for signing and verification is
a useful data point for implementors.

I'm having trouble parsing that.  Aren't all instances of a signed field used 
for verifying already?  Or are you proposing an "If you sign one, you have to 
sign them all" sort of approach?

That will wreak havoc with Received:, if so.

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