On 19/May/11 05:17, John Levine wrote:
The point I was making was that ever more complex ways to decide that
two mutated versions of a message are "the same" aren't likely to help
much, certainly not compared to the large cost of implementing code
even more complex than what relaxed does now.
Just to mention two of those ways, MIME rewriting is a capability
mayor MTAs introduced when MIME took root, HTML styles mangling is an
ongoing MUA exercise.
And anyway, if your goal is for your message to survive, you should
armor it better, not come up with more arcane ways to declare that
it may be bleeding heavily but it's not dead yet.
Interesting, but not less intricate. The semantics of authenticating
only the armored part of a message is not obvious. Resorting to
base64 encoding is subject to varying interpretations, including
spammers attempts to avoid naive content filtering.
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