Charles Lindsey wrote:
I think is is clear that these attacks will work if deployers fail to
watch out for them. The only question is how long it will take the Bad
Guys to spot the opportunities (and for sure they WILL spot them - sooner
probably than later).
+1
To me, the protocol requires a highlighted explicit ONE FROM signing
and verifier rule. It SHOULD NOT continue to sign a multi-from
message, and it SHOULD invalidate the verification of a multi-from
message.
Anything above that is SWAGGING and exploratory in nature and a
consideration only to address legacy signers and verifiers, which
includes receivers or internal mail creators don't allow multiple from
headers.
--
Hector Santos, CTO
http://www.santronics.com
http://santronics.blogspot.com
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