-----Original Message-----
From: ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org
[mailto:ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Douglas Otis
Sent: Thursday, July 07, 2011 6:47 PM
To: ietf-dkim(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] Final update to 4871bis for working group review
Unfortunately, the norm is not to make these checks because only DKIM
invites the possible exploit. DKIM MUST accept the role of preventing
the exploit it invites.
This is logically equivalent to saying SSL or TLS has to ensure the validity of
the payload it is securing, because since that payload has been secured, people
will assume it's also valid. Will you be taking your fight to the TLS working
group as well, then?
Otherwise, this is merely a repetition of the same argument that got us the
DISCUSS in the first place. One might even call it a replay attack...
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