On 06/20/2013 03:05 AM, John R. Levine wrote:
Now on the other hand, if an administrative domain wanted to go to the
trouble to authenticate down to the user level, we didn't want to prevent
that, either. The primary audience for DKIM includes regulated industries,
Seems to me that works fine as is. If a stock broker wants to set up its
mail system to put an i= into DKIM that reliably identifies the person who
sent the mail, they can do that.
But unless I have external knowledge that they do that, and trust them to
do it right, I can't depend on it,
Why do you raise this concern for "i=" and not for "d="? Simply looking
at "d=" we can't differentiate between a Good Guy and a Bad Guy, until
we have built some history/reputation for that particular "d=" domain.
Why wouldn't the same logic hold for "i="?
That is: if a Signer, despite the wording of RFC6376 par 3.5 on "i=",
chooses to use a non-default "i=" then the Verifier may assume the
Signer is intentionally signing with "i=" and the Verifier is allowed to
use the information of "i=" for whatever purpose it is verifying the
signature (e.g. building a reputation profile of that "d=,i=" combination.
If we wanted the Verifier to never ever use the "i=" information, we
should have written this as a 'MUST NOT' in RFC6376 (and not only in an
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