On Wed 16/Nov/2016 14:00:26 +0100 Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
On Wed, Nov 16, 2016 at 7:57 PM, Alessandro Vesely <vesely(_at_)tana(_dot_)it>
wrote:
That way it will stay dormant until someone gets hurt and has to activate
it, at which time it may cause more damage than improvement. A loose
cannon.
The document makes that risk clear, or so I thought.
You mean Section 5?
Finally, if you stick to one recipient per message, why do you rack your
brains about encryption? I suggest adding a Disclosed-BCC: header field
with the recipient address in the same 5322.address-list cleartext format
as the other address fields, and sign it FWIW. It won't break more privacy
than Delivered-To: does.
I don't follow. There's no additional encryption going on here.
I mean the SHA transformation. Cleartext is obviously easier to understand and
debug.
Adding a "Disclosed-BCC" field guarantees disclosure, rather than only
disclosing if the MDA adds a Delivered-To. I don't think we should make
that worse.
So long as you disclose it to the very recipient, there is no worry. NDNs
customarily report SMTP chit-chat in cleartext, betraying users who attempt to
hide their real address behind a dot-forward. Log files are plenty of envelope
citations. Received: fields feature a FOR clause which is not deprecated for
single recipient messages. We're not worsening anything.
Ale
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