What's the actual damage here? Does, say, gmail.com's reputation suffer
when it signs spam that then gets replayed?
On Mon, Nov 21, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Brandon Long <blong(_at_)google(_dot_)com>
wrote:
In examples we've seen, the mail is delivered to a host and immediately
(seconds) picked up by the spammers botnet and millions of copies sent.
Short of charging an exorbitant amount of money per message sent, I don't
see how any service can prevent sending a single spam message with 100%
accuracy.
Brandon
On Nov 15, 2016 12:52 PM, "Murray S. Kucherawy"
<superuser(_at_)gmail(_dot_)com>
wrote:
On Wed, Nov 16, 2016 at 5:11 AM, Michael Thomas <mike(_at_)mtcc(_dot_)com>
wrote:
So, when the filters catch up, it will then mark it as spam again
regardless of the DKIM signature.
So what exactly is the problem here?
I suppose when the filters catch up, the spammer can no longer get
$HIGH_REPUTATION_MAIL_SERVER to sign that message until the next hole is
discovered. But everything submitted and replayed prior to that has
already gone out and been delivered on the basis of that reputation.
That's the problem here.
-MSK
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