Yes, I understand this. MARID doesn't propose anything to do with
authorization though, so you confused the issue for me (and I hope
others). Without authorization this way of looking at MARID buys you
nothing as far as I can see.
Authorization = Accreditation + Heuristics.
Even if you don't believe in accreditation, it is pretty easy to
build useful rule bases for authentorization using the method I
described.
This *is* different to the SPF proposal (and other LMAP schemes that
propose to reject on MAIL FROM), which aim to stop invalid
bounces for mail I didn't send.
Under what circumstances?
Purported sender implements SPF publication
Receiver implements SPF verification
Receiver does not bounce message from false sender
Seems like a lot of adoption has to take place to get value.
I am arguing that suppressing the fake bounce messages is simply one
immediate payoff from a much more general purpose technology.
Incidentaly for a bounce message we have:
2821 From = <>
2822 From = <>
So if that is all we are trying to do one wonders what the 2821/2822
argument is about.