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Re: Just say NO to key escrow or CMR/ARR revisited

1997-11-05 09:55:21
I have *tried* and *tried* to remain entirely non-abusive and stick to
the facts here. But since you are determined to attack this position -
your choice.

Oh please, this is just more bad logic on top of bad logic.

Oh please, this is entirely non-substantiated irrelevant abuse. Save it
for somewhere else.

Having a CMR flag in some public keys does not mean that everyone
is using CMR

It does if a government mandates it. May I remind you what Barbara
Simons of the ACM's US Public Policy Committee said (since it seems to
have gone RIGHT over your head):

4. The NSA states that key recovery is doable and will not jeopardize
national security. And there is an existence proof for key recovery
software in the new PGP release.

No that is not the purpose of this group. The purpose of this group is to
provide a strong message encryption standard.

Well, why don't we just go with S/MIME then? That provides a strong
encryption standard within the US. DOH! It allows 40-bit encryption as
well. Oh well.

Debate on the technical
merits of any part of the spec is warranted, political fearmongering is

So, what would you describe Phil Zimmerman's speeches about human rights
and encryption as?

Lets see here, you take a quote of a quote from a competitor of PGP Inc.
as a factual statement and the basis of support for your position. Sorry
you will have to do better than that.

Oh sorry, I didn't realise that a direct quote from Phil by a
'competitor' of PGP's was less valid than anyone else's. And Bruce
Schneier - what kind of clueless snake-oil purveyor is he? (IRONY

Let me quote Phil directly, from pgpdoc1. Is that OK?

Most alarming of all is the White House's bold new encryption policy
initiative, under development at NSA since the start of the Bush
administration, and unveiled April 16th, 1993. The centerpiece of this
initiative is a Government-built encryption device, called the Clipper
chip, containing a new classified NSA encryption algorithm. The Government
is encouraging private industry to design it into all their secure
communication products, like secure phones, secure FAX,
etc. AT&T is now putting the Clipper into their secure voice products.
The catch: At the time of manufacture, each Clipper chip will be loaded with
its own unique key, and the Government gets to keep a copy, placed in escrow.
Not to worry, though -- the Government promises that they will use these keys
to read your traffic only when duly authorized by law. Of course, to make
Clipper completely effective, the next logical step would be to outlaw other
forms of cryptography. 

Oh I'm sorry. Was that political fearmongering?