On Mon, 26 Jan 1998, Ian Brown wrote:
The ARR stuff was explicitly designed so that implementations that didn't
want to implement it could ignore it safely; it's hard to undo that.
Leave it alone for the standard
That's all I'm asking, and seemed to be the consensus of the group -
document subpacket 10 as "reserved for future use" with no other
comment. This did not seem to be what Jon Callas decided at the IETF
meeting.
Withoutt stating anything, tge critical bit would wreck the signatures on
all keys using this feature. Something more than "reserved for future
use" needs to be said. I'd prefer, " The critical bit may be safely
ignored for this field"..
Ryan anderson
PGP fp: 7E 8E C6 54 96 AC D9 57 E4 F8 AE 9C 10 7E 78 C9
print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U(_at_){$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`