ietf-openpgp
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OpenPGP conformance : MUSTS found in RFC2440

1999-07-20 14:07:23
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I agreed to take on a couple of work items at the OpenPGP meeting in Oslo,
Norway. One of those work items was to enumerate the MUSTS in RFC2440 in
order to help vendors begin conformance testing.

Following is the list I came up with (anyone with some spare time, please
check me on the list). I also plan on forwarding SHOULDS, MAYS, SHOULD
NOTS, etc. hopefully within the next week.

The discussion we had openned the possibility of grouping the lists
together and adding a small amount of additional information. The result
would be an informational RFC probably titled 'OpenPGP Implementor's
Guide.' I am willing to do the bulk of the wordsmithing on the document and
know of two other possible co-authors. Is there any interest in such a
document? 

Anyway, Here are the MUSTS that I found. I have included section numbers
from 2440 and a brief paraphrased description. For more information, read
2440.
=====

OpenPGP MUSTS
 
Section   Summary of requirement
- -------   ----------------------

4.2.3     1st partial length MUST be at least 512 bytes long.

5.1       For multiple Public Key Encrypted Session Key packets,
          implementations MUST make new PKCS-1 padding for each key.

5.2       Implmenetations MUST accept V3 signatures.

5.2.2     1st octet length of hash material MUST be 5. in V3 signature packet.

5.2.2     DSA signatures MUST use hashes with a size of 160 bits to match
          q. The size of the groups generated by the DSA key's generator value.

5.2.3.3   The signature creation time sub-packet MUST be in the hashed
          area of a V4 signature packet. 

5.2.3.15  In Notation Data subpacket all undefined flags in the flag
          field MUST be zero.

5.2.3.16  In key server preferences, all undefined flags MUST be zero.

5.3       The S2K specifier in a Symmentric Key Encrypted Session Key
          packet MUST be Salted or Iterated and Salted. since the IV
          is 0. This is to prevent identical decryption keys if a
          passphrase is re-used.

5.8       Marker packets (tag 10) MUST be ignored when received.

6.2       The Message Armor header 'MessageID' (if it appears) MUST be
          computed from the encrypted signed message in a deterministic
          fashion (rather than being random) to prevent covert
          channels.

9.1       MUST implement DSA for signatures.

9.2       MUST implement 3-DES for symmetric encryption.

9.3       MUST implement uncompressed data.

9.4       MUST implement SHA-1.

11.1      In keys with main keys and sub keys, the primary key MUST be
          capable of signing.

12.1      If an algorithm is used in encryption is not in the user's
          preference list, the implementation SHOULD decrypt anyway
          but MUST warn the user of the protocol violation.

12.4      Implementations supporting RSA in V4 keys MUST implement all
          MUST features from V4 key section.

12.5      If an implementation allows ELGammal signatures, then it
          MUST use the algorithm id 20 for an ElGammal public key that
          can sign.
=====


Tony Mione, RUCS/TD, Rutgers University, Hill 055, Piscataway,NJ - 732-445-0650
mione(_at_)noc(_dot_)rutgers(_dot_)edu                        W3: 
http://noc.rutgers.edu/~mione/
PGPFP:D4EEA987E870277C  24AAE6E9E6ABD088     ***** Important: Rom 10:9-11 *****
Author of 'CDE and Motif : A Practical Primer', Prentice-Hall PTR

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