Hello,
On Mon, Apr 23, 2007 at 05:45:21PM -0400, David Shaw wrote:
I really appreciate if I could read a paper(s) about analysis of this
technique.
http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/067 actually argues for 512 bytes.
Please note the following paper [1] by Andreas Klein, which is submitted
to Designs, Codes and Cryptography. AFAIK his attack is possible, even if
the first bytes of the keystream are discarded.
[1] http://cage.ugent.be/~klein/RC4/RC4-en.ps
Best regards,
--
Heiko Stamer <stamer(_at_)theory(_dot_)informatik(_dot_)uni-kassel(_dot_)de>,
Fon: +49 561 804-6635