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Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CA certificate

2008-12-30 16:32:44


Regardless of that, the authors of the MD5 paper are correct: trust anchors signed with MD5 are highly questionable as of today (well, actually, since they published their last paper). Hopefully, the maintainers of the popular trust anchor repositories (Microsoft, Mozilla, etc.) will yank out the trust anchors signed with MD5 (and MD2!) as soon as possible.

This is a different claim than "CAs should stop issuing certs with MD5 signatures", which is what I as an amateur take away from a quick scan of the material. Obviously MD5 is suspect in various ways, but does this new work lead to the conclusion that MD5-signed roots are untrustworthy today?
Replacing a root is a much bigger deal then changing signing practices.

 - RL "Bob"