RE: [Cfrg] [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CAcertificate

Colleagues - It has been confirmed that no EV issuer is signing certificates 
with MD5.  Also, EV certificates cannot be issued by an automated process, 
putting another obstacle in the path of an attacker.  All the best.  Tim.

Tim Moses
+1 613 270 3183

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-smime(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org 
[mailto:owner-ietf-smime(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Timothy J. 
Miller
Sent: Wednesday, December 31, 2008 10:18 AM
To: Santosh Chokhani
Cc: ietf-pkix(_at_)imc(_dot_)org; ietf-smime(_at_)imc(_dot_)org; 
cfrg(_at_)irtf(_dot_)org; saag(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CAcertificate

Santosh Chokhani wrote:
> One would think we want to start using SHA-1 or even SHA256 (assuming 
> client vendors implement SHA256 ASAP) and ask the CAs emanating from 
> commercial roots to perform responsible I&A before issuing certificates.
Speaking of I&A, I found it interesting to note that the CA/Browser forum 
guidelines for EV certs allows (but recommends against) MD5 until 2010.

The spot check of EV issuers I did yesterday didn't turn up anyone actually 
using MD5, but I didn't have all of 'em available.

-- Tim

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