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RE: [Cfrg] [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CAcertificate

2008-12-31 13:33:27

I am a bit concerned about random goo when random goo is one of the
things the attacker uses to cause collision.  This may limit human or
machine's ability to discern mischief.

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org 
On Behalf Of Dr Stephen Henson
Sent: Wednesday, December 31, 2008 1:12 PM
To: ietf-pkix(_at_)imc(_dot_)org
Cc: ietf-smime(_at_)imc(_dot_)org; cfrg(_at_)irtf(_dot_)org; 
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue

Mike wrote:

I sent my last message a bit too hastily.  Other ideas that I was
contemplating should have been mentioned including:

  - remove any unrecognized extensions
  - remove tumors

Those could potentially cause problems if for some reason they were
actually needed.  This one, though, shouldn't cause trouble:

  - add a private EKU with a random number (or two) in the OID

That would not mess up the serial number scheme in use or modify the
subject name as has been suggested.

Or add a non-critical extension with some randomness in it...

Dr Stephen N. Henson.
Core developer of the   OpenSSL project:
Freelance consultant see:
Email: shenson(_at_)drh-consultancy(_dot_)co(_dot_)uk, PGP key: via homepage.

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