On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 11:23 AM, John Levine <johnl(_at_)taugh(_dot_)com>
wrote:
I agree, and if adopted and deployed, it will require user education/and
careful consideration during deployment not to overstate what this does.
Given how complex this proposal is, I'm wondering whether it wouldn't
be better to do something entirely within the channel, e.g., whole
message encryption using DKIM keys. It would accomplish pretty much
the same thing, while requiring much less of intermediate mail
systems.
R's,
John
FWIW I think your DKIM idea is really good, i.e. provides protection over
intermediary hops that using TLS alone does not provide. I look forward to
see how the DKIM encryption thread develops.
I would point out that much of the complexity is worrying about situations
that could leak information such as the recipient replying or forwarding to
the message, and what to do about bounce messages. It also deals
infrastructure issues such as mailing lists and allowing the protocol to
adapt as the crypto technology changes (as TLS is changing rapidly). I
would argue that a lot of the ideas from this I-D could apply to those
situation for your proposal.
-Wei
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