At 18:03 17-10-2013, Ned Freed wrote:
>I am in complete agreement with this. I think all references to DKIM needs to
>be dropped from this draft. DKIM is not an end-to-end signature or encryption
>mechanism in any case, and adapting it to be used this way diverts attention
>away from what should be the focus here: Protecting the contents of
There are cases where DKIM verification will fail. These cases are
significant enough to avoid DKIM as an end-to-end mechanism. Note
that the are use-cases where DKIM may be appropriate but that is not
really relevant to the problem the draft tries to solve.
Exactly. DKIM has a purpose; this isn't it. Using DKIM in this context will
only make the service less reliable while providing no benefit, and given the
significant reliability risks it already has this is no small thing.
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