Carl asks:
how about
<section title="Community Consensus and Grant of Authority">
<t>
The IETF is a consensus-based group and authority to act on behalf
of the community is an act that requires a high degree of consensus
and the continued consent of the community
After a careful process of deliberation, there is a broad-based
community consensus to house the IETF Administrative & Support
Activities (IASA) within the Internet Society, which is reflected
in this Best Current Practice (BCP) RFC.</t>
<t>
Termination and change. Any change to this agreement shall require
a similar level of community consensus and deliberation and shall
be reflected by a subsequent Best Current Practice (BCP) RFC.
</t>
</section>
I think that is fine but I don't think it addresses quite the issue
I was talking about - Klensin's "Blowing the bolts" posting is
closer to the issue - a number of people seem to want a
principle that the AdminRest should structure the IASA and its
accounts (such as a seperate bank account) in such a way to
enable fast bolt blowing - I think that your 2nd pp is closer to
mechanism than principle but I do not know how to formulate the
principle (the logic in Klensin's posting aside).
2/ The IAD, IAOC and the ISOC shall not have any authority over the
IETF
standards development activities.
That's almost true, but you probably need to address that the fact that
ISOC does play an important role in the standards process, a role
that is not changed by this document.
note that what I'm trying to get at here is that the IAD, IAOC and the
ISOC can not tell the IETF to adopt or not adopt a technology
I thought about the point Carl raises and came to the conclusion
that "no authority of the *standards development activities*" was
accurate - the ISOC BoT does accept the process documents that have
been developed using IETF processes but can not change such documents
on its own, the boT also approves the IAB slate but that did not seem
to me to be controling the standards development activities - the
thing that comes closest in theory is that the ISOC BoT can act as
the final step in an appeal that claims the standards process is flawed
but in any such case I would expect the BoT (if the appeal were to be
successful) would point out to the IETF what the problem was and
leave it to the IETF to figure out how to fix it not change the
process by itself
in any case I think that the basic principle is that these groups
have "no authority of the standards development activities" is a clean
one to state - elsewhere in the document the details about
approvals and appeals can be explained
7/ The right to use any intellectual property rights created by any
IASA-related or IETF activity may not be withheld by the ISOC from the
IETF.
how about "withheld or limited in any way"?
that is a better thing to say
Scott
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