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RE: Assuring ISOC commitment to AdminRest

2004-12-12 13:34:15
Bert,

I think Pete proposed "the IAS BCP should not take effect,
regardless of what other provisions it contains, until ISOC
modifies their bylaws in a way dictated by the IETF and,
presumably, by provisions to be incorporated by the BCP".  That
strikes me a fairly concrete.  My response was, admittedly, more
abstract, but its bottom line is that, IMO, no such
modifications or text are needed and that, if there really were
a problem, what Pete proposes is the wrong way to go about
solving it.

   john


--On Sunday, 12 December, 2004 21:06 +0100 "Wijnen, Bert (Bert)"
<bwijnen(_at_)lucent(_dot_)com> wrote:

Is it just me or what????

This debate between John and Pete seems to be at such an
abstract meta level to me, that I have difficulty to try and
see what it means for the IAS BCP doc that I thinkwe are
trying to get consensus on.

As I said, it could be just me, but I seem unable to map it to
any issue(s) with the curremt text in rev 02 of the doc.

Bert

-----Original Message-----
From: ietf-bounces(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org 
[mailto:ietf-bounces(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org]On
Behalf Of John C Klensin
Sent: Sunday, December 12, 2004 16:44
To: Pete Resnick
Cc: ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: Assuring ISOC commitment to AdminRest


--On Saturday, 11 December, 2004 16:00 -0600 Pete Resnick
<presnick(_at_)qualcomm(_dot_)com> wrote:

On 12/11/04 at 3:07 PM -0500, John C Klensin wrote:

I suspect that, were ISOC to start changing their bylaws in
this  sort of direction and in ways that would actually
provide the  guarantees you want, they would reasonably
insist on reciprocal  provisions that would prevent IETF
from unwinding the relationship  without cause, would
permit them to step in if they concluded that  IETF was
about to self-destruct (or fizzle out) -- see my earlier
note on the implications of IETF's going under--and so on.

As far as preventing the IETF from unwinding the
relationship: To unwind the relationship from the IETF side
would take a change in the BCP, with IETF-wide consensus.
It is exactly that fact, and the fact that the current
state of affairs only requires a simple majority of the
ISOC board to unwind, which I think mandates this.
Unwinding the relationship on the IETF side would be a "big
deal".

As far as I can tell, to unwind the relationship in practice
requires, in practice, an assertion of an emergency and
decision by the IETF Chair, perhaps in collaboration with the
IAOC Chair (if it turns out to have one) and/or IAD.  Doing
it that way would require simply ignoring the proposed
language of the BCP, but there is, unfortunately, significant
precedent for just such actions.  And before I go on, I want
to repeat that my one of my two main concerns is less with
your note than with the concern that we are focusing our risk
analysis and protection mechanisms in the wrong place.

As far as self-destruction: If such is imminent, I cannot
imagine that the ISOC board can not get four-fifths of
themselves (the amount needed to make a by-law change) to
agree to rescind the by-law I propose.

Rather than debate the appropriateness of various analogies (I
think we aren't going to agree), let's take this up an
abstraction level.  The conventional wisdom about good-quality
standards is that one should specify requirements and
behavior, not particular technologies and mechanisms.   I
suggest that the same rule should apply here.   Suppose you
had said 

             "It is unreasonable for the IETF to require a whole
             BCP-approval and publication process to unwind, while
             ISOC would require only a majority vote.  We need to
             work out a model with ISOC that requires a more serious
             process, perhaps a supermajority vote."

Despite some concern about a focus on the wrong risks (see
above), you probably would have heard nothing from me.  Or
perhaps you would have heard a suggestion that maybe a single
Board vote might not be sufficient and that something else --
e.g., approval from the AC as well, Board votes at consecutive
meetings -- might be more helpful than a one-meeting
supermajority.  But I don't know much, if any, more about how
to predict internal ISOC dynamics than you do, so I would
think that the above would lead to an interaction with ISOC
in which the IETF would say, more or less, 

             "It doesn't feel to us that your needing only a simple
             majority of the Board, at one meeting, to blow this off
             is sufficient protection for this agreement.    What
             would you suggest, within your procedures and dynamics,
             to solve that problem?"

That is consistent with the sort of partnership I think we
should be looking for here and which I think the community
more or less signed off on in moving toward Scenario O.

But your note doesn't seem to say that.   Instead, it seemed
to say, at least in my reading, "we should not let this go
through unless ISOC agrees to Bylaws changes that are
dictated by the IETF".     I don't know what the implied "or
else" clause is, unless someone is looking for an excuse to
return to Scenario C, certainly we won't give up on
reorganizing entirely if they don't.

I don't want to see ISOC dictating anything to the IETF.  I
don't want the IETF dictating anything to ISOC.   I want to
see a partnership in which the two organizations work
together to identify and solve problems, with reasonable
assumptions of good faith.  Those assumptions should at least
be good for today, even if you (or we) insist that future
behavior is completely unpredictable.   And, within the
context of those assumptions, we should be dealing with each
other on the basis of "we see a problem on your side of the
boundary, please suggest to us how you would like to solve it
or explain why it really is not an issue".   If, as I have
been saying for many months, we treat each other as hostile
parties rather than as partners working together for common
ends we both value, this just isn't going to work, no matter
what words we get on paper.

      john


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