If we want to get some clarity in this debate it would be appropriate
to quote the relevant RFCs. RFC 2418 has been updated by RFC 3934
(BCP 94). The change is that posting rights on a WG mailing list is
not removed anymore by the IESG on AD proposition. But by the WG
Chair, for a maximum period of 30 days. The warning/removal (for no
more than 30 days) sequence can be repeated indefinitely until the AD
decides to engage an RFC 3683 (BSP 83) procedure.
RFC 3683 restores the decision by the IESG which permits longer
suspension and to extend this suspension to other mailing lists.
Return to positing rights is also an IESG decision. This is at least
the way I read it.
This system does not address the most serious/interesting source of
this type of problem: when the opposition is to an IETF consensus by
another external consensus. At a time where the hysteresis of the
network deployment makes erroneous propositions to stay "for ever",
if some group identifies a proposition as harmful, it cannot simply
wait for it to deprecate after failing the market filter. It must
make sure that the proposition is corrected before being approved by
the IESG. If the proposition has an IETF consensus we have a conflict.
- either the IETF must find a way to welcome that group as part of
the IETF and there is no more consensus and a solution can be found
along with the Internet standard process rules.
- or the IETF must be prepared to an endless battle where it will ban
for life the current representative of the group every week, day ...
On may imagine the havoc this would create.
My proposition would be to create a "minority position" system. Where
such groups could be accepted as opposing without having to be
fighting. They would be more stringently subject to suspension, but
could freely comment in their context everyone would know. The
proposed deliverable would include their comments - the IESG to
decide if they would be attached to the RFC or not. At least this
would remove the noise over the noise, would oblige the WG to
understand the reasons of their opposition and probably lead to a
final consensus. The obvious interest of such "minority positions"
would be to be cooperative, so the IESG would consider their position
in the final consensus.
Experience shows that progress usually comes from this kind of
minority position.
jfc
At 12:11 27/09/2005, John Leslie wrote:
Wijnen, Bert (Bert) <bwijnen(_at_)lucent(_dot_)com> wrote:
>
> I certainly hope that we do not have to have the equivalent of an
> "IETF Last Call" everytime that a WG chair or AD finds that an individual
> is disrupting normal WG process.
RFC 3683 (BCP 83) is concise enough to quote the applicable part in
its entirety:
<snip>
> RFC2418 allows a WG chair and the ADs to also take measures if someone
> is disrupting WG progress (sect 3.2).
<snip>
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